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COMMENTS
STEROID TESTING POLICIES IN
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: REGULATED BY
CONGRESS OR THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE LEAGUES?
I. INTRODUCTION
Drug testing' for performance enhancing drugs in professional team
sports2 has become a major topic of interest due to extensive media coverage
of recent sports doping issues and Congress's involvement with the issue. At
the heart of the issue is whether drug testing policies should be regulated by
Congress or remain under the control of the sports leagues and players to
implement as they see fit. This issue carries with it short- and long-term
consequences affecting the leagues, the players, and their interactions with
each other. Also affected are those who watch, and at times live,3 the
entertainment that is professional sports. The fans' perceptions of the integrity
and fairness of the game are at stake, and with it, the viability and well-being
of the leagues.
Although steroid use may have been present in professional sports in the
past, only recently has it come to the forefront, due in large part to Major
League Baseball (MLB). 4 Much of this attention began in 1998 when
1. Drug testing as used throughout this Comment will refer to drug testing for steroids and other
performance enhancing drugs and not drug testing for narcotics such as marijuana and cocaine.
Professional leagues have been drug testing for narcotics longer than they have been testing for
performance enhancing drugs, and testing positive for narcotics often has different consequences than
testing positive for performance enhancing substances.
2. Professional sports as used in this Comment will refer to the four major professional sports
leagues in the United States: Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association
(NBA), the National Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey League (NHL).
3. Sports fans tend to form strong emotional alliances with specific teams, with their emotional
well-being resting on whether their team wins or loses.
4. This Comment pertains to the four major professional sports leagues; however, the actions of
MLB players attracted much of the initial attention to steroid use in professional sports, and
consequently, were a primary focus of congressional action.
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Androstenedione (Andro) was discovered in Mark McGwire's locker.5
However, at the time, most steroids and performance enhancing drugs were
not banned by MLB.6 Four years later, in 2002, a federal investigation of the
Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO) began.7 BALCO was a company
that created a designer steroid, THG, which was, at that time, undetectable. 8
Home run giant Barry Bonds 9 was a BALCO client, although he denied
knowingly taking THG. l0 Later in 2002, Jose Canseco and Ken Caminiti
claimed that eighty-five percent and fifty percent, respectively, of MLB
players used steroids. " I
In 2004, President Bush included drug testing in his State of the Union
address, calling for professional sports leagues to increase their fight against
steroid use by players:
Athletics play such an important role in our society, but,
unfortunately, some in professional sports are not setting much of an
example. The use of performance enhancing drugs like steroids in
baseball, football, and other sports is dangerous, and it sends the
wrong message-that there are shortcuts to accomplishment, and that
performance is more important than character. So tonight I call on
team owners, union representatives, coaches, and players to take the
lead, to send the right signal, to get tough, and to get rid of steroids
now. 12
5. Major League Baseball, Drug Policy in Baseball Event Timeline, MLB.COM,
http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/drug-policy.jsp?content-timeline (last visited Feb. 9,
2006) [hereinafter MLB Drug Policy Timeline]. McGwire is currently seventh all-time for home runs
hit with 583. MLB Home Run Tracker, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.comlmlb/hrtracker (last
visited July 17, 2006). He also set the record for the most home runs hit in a season with seventy
before it was eclipsed by Barry Bonds. All-Time Single-Season Home Run Leaders, ESPN.COM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/alltime/leaders?breakdown=0&year=0&type=0&sort-8 (last visited
July 17, 2006).
6. MLB Drug Policy Timeline, supra note 5.
7. Balco Investigation Timeline, USA TODAY, Aug. 3, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
balco-timeline.htm.
8. Id.
9. Bonds is currently second all-time for home runs hit, twenty-one behind the leader, Hank
Aaron. MLB Home Run Tracker, supra note 5. Bonds also holds the record for the most home runs
hit in a season with seventy-three. All-Time Single-Season Home Run Leaders, supra note 5.
10. Balco Investigation Timeline, supra note 7.
11. John Shea & Susan Slusser, Baseball Players' Tests Show Steroid Use;
Dozens of Positives to Bring Continued Checks, New Penalties, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14, 2003, at Al,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2003/11/14/MNGOV3 1 U7Q I .DTL.
12. President George W. Bush, 2004 State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
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Because all of the professional leagues were slow to implement changes in
their drug testing policies, their ability to self-police was in doubt and
Congress heeded the President's call to action as its own. In 2005, Congress
introduced multiple bills designed to regulate drug testing in the professional
sports leagues. 13
Although significant attention has been given to professional athletes' use
of performance enhancing drugs by the media and Congress, whether the use
of such substances by athletes is a significant problem when examined across
all of the professional sports leagues1 4 is debatable. During the 2005 season,
twelve MLB players received suspensions for violating the steroid policy, 15
and in 2006, none have tested positive so far. 16 In the minor leagues, thirty-
four players tested positive during 2006.17 No NHL players tested positive
during the 2005-2006 season.
8
This Comment proposes that, while it is in the best interests of the leagues
to promulgate drug testing policies that are perceived by the public as
protecting the integrity of the game, it is not, and should not be, Congress's
responsibility to mandate a drug testing policy to which all the leagues must
adhere. This Comment will focus on: (1) collective bargaining in professional
sports, (2) the drug testing policies of the four professional sports leagues, (3)
Congress's proposed drug testing requirements and a comparison with the
leagues' current policies, (4) a legal analysis on the premise that Congress did
enact a mandatory drug testing policy, and (5) an analysis of where the
13. The bills include four in the House of Representatives: Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084,
109th Cong. (2005); Clean Sports Act of 2005, H.R. 2565, 109th Cong. (superceded by H.R. 1862);
Professional Sports Integrity Act of 2005, H.R. 2516, 109th Cong.; and three in the Senate: Clean
Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. (companion bill to H.R. 2565); Integrity in Professional
Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005); and Professional Sports Responsibility and Accountability
Act, S. 1334, 109th Cong. (2005).
14. While a rash of positive drug tests in 2006 of track stars Justin Gatlin and Marion Jones (who
was later cleared of charges) and Tour de France winner Floyd Landis seem to indicate that use of
performance enhancing drugs is a problem, these athletes are individual athletes and not team sport
athletes who Congress is focusing its attention toward. See infra section IV.
15. Lawton Becomes 12th Suspended for Steroids, ESPN.cOM, Nov. 2, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2211753.
16. Statistic current through August 30, 2006. See Barry M. Bloom, Grimsley Suspended for 50
Games, MLB.COM, June 12, 2006, http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/news/article.jsp?ymd =
2 0060612&content id=1501780&vkey=news mlb&fext=.jsp&cid-mlb. As the title suggests,
Grimsley was suspended for violating the drug testing policy, but he did not test positive for
performance enhancing drugs. Id.
17. Dodgers Minor Leaguer Suspended 50 Games, ESPN.com, Aug. 29, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section-mlb&id=2565462.
18. No Players Failed Drug Tests This Season, NHL Says, ESPN.COM, June 12, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=248113 1.
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responsibility of regulating drug testing in professional sports should fall.
II. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Unionization and collective bargaining by players in professional sports
leagues is regulated by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which
governs employer-employee relations. 19 The NLRA gives employees the right
to form and join labor organizations, collectively bargain, and "engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining." 20
The first union of players in professional sports was the National
Basketball Players Association, which formed in 1964,21 followed closely by
the Major League Baseball Players Association in 1965.22 Two years later,
the National Hockey League Players Association was formed,23 and lastly, the
National Football League Players Association in 1970.24
Shortly after, or concurrently with, the formation of players' unions, the
first collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) were created between the
players and the owners. The National Basketball Players Association
completed the first CBA of any of the professional sports leagues in 1964,25
with MLB players following in 1968.26 While the complexity of, and
important issues in, CBAs have changed since the first agreements, they are
still the "primary basis for determining legal relationships between owners and
19. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994). Professional sports are covered
by the NLRA because the National Labor Relations Board ruled that professional sports leagues are
an industry affecting interstate commerce, which is the requisite nexus to be covered under the
NLRA. MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION 513 (2005).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
21. See NBA Players Ass'n, NBPA History, http://nbpa.com/history.php (last visited Oct. 20,
2005). The NBPA was formed in 1954 but was not recognized by the owners as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the players until 1964. See id.
22. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, MLBPA Info, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/NASApp/
mlb/pa/info/history.jsp (last visited Oct. 20, 2005). Many efforts over the years were taken to
unionize players in baseball, including the first baseball union, the Brotherhood of Professional Base
Ball Players in 1885. Id.
23. Nat'l Hockey League Players Ass'n, Origins of the NHLPA, http://nhlpa.com/About
TheNHLPA/Whatls.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
24. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, History, http://www.nflpa.org/AboutUs/NFLPA-
History.aspx#6 (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). Although the association was formed in 1956, it was not
formally recognized as a union until 1970. See id.
25. NBA Players Ass'n, supra note 21. However, the NFLPA had the first rudimentary forms of
bargaining, with the NFL owners acquiescing to the demands of the players after the players won a
court case that held the NFL was subject to antitrust laws. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, supra
note 24.
26. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, supra note 22.
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players in professional sports today." 27
In the collective bargaining relationship, the NLRA requires the employee
and employer to bargain in good faith for "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. ' 28 Failure by either party to bargain over these
terms at the request of the other party, or the employer unilaterally
implementing these terms, will constitute an unfair labor practice.29 Because
players in the professional leagues are unionized, the union and owners must
follow the NLRA's mandates governing collective bargaining.30
In the context of the NLRA, what constitutes wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment is not always clear. However, it has been
established that drug testing of employees is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining, and therefore, it must be bargained for in good faith.31 Therefore,
before professional sports leagues can implement drug testing, the policies
must be collectively bargained for between the players' union and the league;
the league or teams cannot unilaterally implement a policy.
By its nature, collective bargaining takes a significant amount of time and
effort, with changes to the CBA slow to happen. This is also true for drug
testing policies, where compromise may not be easily attained. The players
have a lot at stake and the unions are hesitant to agree to broad policies with
harsh penalties.32 While the union and the players are concerned with the
privacy of the athletes, 33 "the consequences to the athlete for proven drug
usage" is the greatest concern. 34 These consequences range from partial
season suspensions to loss of salaries and endorsement deals and possibly the
end of careers. 35
III. SURVEY OF STEROID TESTING POLICIES OF THE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
27. MITTEN, supra note 19, at 586.
28. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
29. Id.
30. See Allan H. "Bud" Selig & Robert D. Manfred Jr., The Regulation of Nutritional
Supplements in Professional Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 35, 48 (2004).
31. Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180, 182 (1989) (finding that drug and alcohol testing is
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining because it is "germane to the working environment, and
outside the scope of managerial decisions," which are two criteria the Supreme Court had established
for mandatory subject matters).
32. MITTEN, supra note 19, at 658.
33. In respect to drug testing, professional athletes have only the privacy interests given to them
by the CBA; therefore, unions are hesitant to agree to harsher drug testing measures, such as
increasing the number of times a player can be tested and adding off-season testing to give the
athletes more privacy. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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LEAGUES
In 2005, drug testing policies in professional sports underwent
significant changes. These changes were due to new CBAs and the pressure
put on the leagues by Congress. Of the four major professional leagues, the
NBA and the NHL negotiated new CBAs in 2005, which contained updated
steroid testing policies, and MLB collectively bargained a new drug testing
policy. These new policies differ extensively from the previous versions in the
type of testing, the frequency of player testing, and the penalties for violating
the policy.
A. National Basketball Association
Drug testing for steroids under the 1999 CBA provided for testing in three
situations. First, a player could be tested for reasonable cause. 36 Reasonable
cause was determined by an independent expert, who was responsible for
examining the relevant information and deciding if there was reasonable cause
to test the player.37 Second, all first-year players were required to be tested.38
The CBA required testing of all first-year players once during training camp
and at any time during the season, on no more than three occasions. 39 Third,
veteran players could be tested on a limited basis-only once during training
camp. 40 Players were tested for fifteen different steroids,41 and the penalties
for testing positive were a five-game suspension for the first positive test, a ten
game suspension for the second, and a twenty-five game suspension for any
subsequent violation.42
The 2005 CBA instituted a more stringent drug testing policy, increasing
the number of prohibited substances and penalties and introducing random
drug testing for all players.43 Under the policy, a player can be randomly
tested up to four times each season. Any player, regardless of status, must
"undergo testing ...without prior notice ... [and] testing . ..will be
conducted according to a random player selection procedure by a third-party
36. See NAT'L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSN, NBPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art.
XXXIII § 5 (1999).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 6.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 7.
41. Id. exhibit 1-2.
42. Id. art. XXXIII, § 10(c).
43. NAT'L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS'N, NBPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art.
XXXIII (2005) [hereinafter 2005 NBA CBA].
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organization." 44 Under the policy, the "list of performance enhancing drugs
has been substantially broadened ' 4 5 to include eighty-seven steroids,
performance enhancing drugs, and masking agents.46 Also, the penalties for
violating the policy have been increased, with a ten-game suspension for the
first positive test, a twenty-five game suspension for the second, a one-year
suspension for the third, and permanent dismissal from the league for the
fourth violation.
47
B. National Football League
The NFL has been at the forefront of steroid testing in professional sports
in the United States. The NFL began testing in 1987, suspending players in
1989, and testing year-round in 1990.48 Additionally, the league has
continually updated its list of prohibited substances to stay ahead of designer
steroids.49 In fact, the league banned the use of Andro before Congress
designated it a controlled substance and Ephedra before the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) banned it.50
Under the 1998 CBA, all players were tested at least once a year in
training camp. 51  During the preseason and regular season, players were
randomly selected each week to undergo drug testing.52 For in-season testing,
there was no limit on the number of times a player could be tested, and players
participating on a team that made the playoffs were subject to random testing
for as long as their team remained active. 53 For off-season testing, players
were selected in the same manner as in-season testing and could be tested up
to two times. 54 Players were tested for sixty-one performance enhancing
44. Id.
45. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, CBA Principle Deal Points § IV, http://www.nba.com/news/
cbasummary_050804.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
46. See 2005 NBA CBA, supra note 43, exhibit 1-2.
47. Id. art. XXXIII § 9(c). Under permanent dismissal, a player cannot participate in the league
for a minimum of two years. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, supra note 45, §§ 11-12. After two years, he
can apply for reinstatement. Id.
48. The Drug Free Sports Act of 2005: Hearings on HR. 1862 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 109th
Cong. 105 (2005) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1862] (statement of Gene Upshaw, Executive
Director, National Football League Players Association).
49. Id. at 98 (statement of Paul Tagliabue, Commissioner, National Football League).
50. Id. at 100.
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substances, 55 and if they violated the testing policy, were subject to a four-
game suspension for the first positive test, a six game suspension for the
second, and at least a twelve month suspension for the third violation. 56 In
2006, the NFL and the Players Association agreed on a new steroid testing
policy. 57 The new policy is similar to the previous policy, except that players
can be tested up to six times in the off-season 58 for eighty-four performance
enhancing substances 59 and will be suspended for eight games for the second
positive test.60
C. Major League Baseball
In 2002, for the first time ever, the league and players agreed on a drug
testing policy for steroids as part of their CBA.61 Until 2002, the union had
refused to collectively bargain over any steroid testing, claiming that it
invaded the players' privacy and "was an abuse of human rights." 62 The CBA
required survey testing of players for the 2003 season.63 Under the survey
testing, each player was tested twice with no punishment for a positive test.64
If more than five percent of players tested positive, then mandatory testing for
the following seasons would be implemented until positive tests were under
two and one-half percent in consecutive years. 65 During the 2003 season,
1438 players were survey tested, with between five and seven percent of the
players testing positive. 66 Thus, mandatory testing was implemented for the
2004 season, but under this testing, a player testing positive was subject only
to further testing and a treatment program; no suspensions were included in
55. See id. app. A. These substances included thirty-four anabolic agents, nineteen masking
agents, and eight stimulants. Id.
56. Id. § 6.
57. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, POLICY ON ANABOLIC STEROIDS AND RELATED SUBSTANCES
(2006), available at http://nflpa.com/PDFs/rulesandregs/bannedsubstances.pdf.
58. Id. § 3(A).
59. See id. app. A (listing forty-seven anabolic agents, twenty-two masking agents, five
hormones and other agents, and ten stimulants).
60. Id. § 6.
61. Scott Danaher, Comment, Drug Abuse in Major League Baseball: A Look at Drug Testing in
the Past, in the Present, and Steps For the Future, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 305, 322
(2004).
62. Barry M. Bloom, Mandatory Steroid Testing to Begin, MLB.COM, Nov. 13, 2003,
http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/news/article.jsp?ymd=20031113&contentid=603458&vkey=news
_mlb&fext-.jsp&c-id-mlb.
63. MLB Drug Policy Timeline, supra note 5.
64. Danaher, supra note 61, at 323.
65. Id.
66. MLB Drug Policy Timeline, supra note 5.
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the punishment for violating the policy. 67
For the 2005 season, the league and the union agreed upon a more
stringent drug testing policy.68 Under this policy, all players were subject to
random testing for forty-five banned steroids and various other precursors69 at
least once during the season. 70 Discipline included a ten-day suspension for
the first positive test, a thirty-day suspension for the second, a sixty-day
suspension for the third, and a one year suspension for the fourth violation.71
During the 2005 season, twelve players were suspended for violating the
steroid policy, all of them receiving the ten-day suspension.72
Toward the beginning of the 2005 season, Commissioner Selig requested
that the players' union chief, Don Fehr, reopen negotiations on the drug
policy.73 Selig proposed a fifty game suspension for the first positive drug
test, a one hundred game suspension for the second, and a permanent ban for
the third violation. 74 The union later countered the proposal, offering to
accept a policy that started with a twenty game suspension for the first
offense. 75 An agreement between the two sides was expected by the end of
October 2005,76 and a new drug policy for the 2006 season was announced
mid-November. 77
The new policy tests all athletes for steroids and amphetamines 78 once
67. Id.
68. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, ATTACHMENT 18, BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
AMERICAN LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS AND THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS AND MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (2005),
available at http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/j oint drug-prevention and treatmentprogram
_2005.pdf [hereinafter MLB Drug Testing Policy].
69. Id. § 2(B).
70. Id. § 3(A)(1).
71. Id. § 9(B).
72. Lawton Becomes 12th Suspended for Steroids, supra note 15.
73. MLB Drug Policy Timeline, supra note 5.
74. Id.
75. New Steroids Policy Could Happen by Series, ESPN.COM, Sept. 28, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2174716&type=story.
76. Id.
77. Press Release, Major League Baseball, MLB, MLBPA Announce New Drug Agreement
(Nov. 15, 2005), available at http://mlb.mlb.convNASApp/mlb/news/press-releases/pressrelease
.jsp?ymd=20051115&contentid= 1268552&vkey-pr mlb&fext=.jsp&c-id-mlb?.
78. Amphetamines are stimulants used to increase alertness and physical ability. Division of
Alcohol and Drug Abuse, Stimulants, http://www.well.com/user/woa/fsstim.htm (last visited Dec. 7,
2005). They are a controlled substance, obtained only through a prescription from a doctor. Id.
Amphetamines are viewed by most as being more widely used by MLB players than steroids. Mark
Kreidler, Baseball Finally Brings Amphetamines into Light of Day, ESPN.COM, Nov. 15, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist-kreidler-mark&id=2225013. The use of
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during the pre-season and at least once during the season.79 Players are also
subject to unlimited random testing throughout the season and off-season.8 0
The penalties for testing positive for a steroid are fifty games for the first
positive test, one hundred games for the second, and a lifetime ban for the
third violation.8' For amphetamines, a player is subject to mandatory follow-
up testing for the first positive test, a twenty-five game suspension for the
second, eighty game suspension for the third, and discipline by the
commissioner of up to a lifetime ban for the fourth violation.82
D. National Hockey League
The NHL's first steroid testing policy was introduced in the 2005 CBA.
Under the policy, every player is subject to two random tests during the
season83-one as part of the player's whole team being tested and one where
the player is tested individually.8 4 Penalties for testing positive for a steroid
are a twenty-game suspension for the first positive test, a sixty game
suspension for the second, and a permanent suspension for the third
violation.85
IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Six bills introduced in Congress in 2005 sought to regulate the use of
performance enhancing drugs in professional sports by requiring mandatory
drug testing. However, each bill undertakes to accomplish this in a slightly
different way from its counterparts in terms of which leagues must implement
the policy, the number of times a player could be tested, the prohibited
substances, and the penalty for testing positive for a performance enhancing
drug.
Congress introduced these bills seeking to regulate drug testing in
amphetamines in MLB goes back to the 1980s, and it is estimated that as many as fifty percent of
MLB players use them to get energy before games. Id.
79. Press Release, Major League Baseball, supra note 77.
80. Id.
81. Id. However, a player can seek reinstatement to the league after serving a two-year
suspension. Id.
82. Id.
83. NAT'L HOCKEY LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL
HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION art. 47.6 (2005)
[hereinafter NHL CBA].
84. Nat'l Hockey League, NHL, NHLPA Team Up Against Performance-Enhancing Substances,
NHL.COM, July 22, 2005, http://www.nhl.com/nhlhq/cba/drug-testing072205.html.
85. NHL CBA, supra note 83, art. 47.7.
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professional sports for a variety of reasons. The two main justifications set
forth were protecting the "integrity and value of sports and . . . reduc[ing]
performance enhancing substance use by youth." 86 Congress felt that steroid
use in professional sports was undermining the values of sports by desecrating
the "honesty, integrity, and innate human ability," cheating the athletes, fans,
and the history of the sport, 87 and setting a bad example for young athletes
who look up to the professional athletes as role models.
88
A. Drug Free Sports Act 89
The Drug Free Sports Act, introduced in the House of Representatives, is
the most developed of the bills in Congress.9" It would require that the four
major professional sports leagues, as well as Major League Soccer and the
Arena Football League, implement the guidelines set forth in the bill.9 1 The
bill requires that each athlete be tested a minimum of five times each year,
regardless of whether the athlete is in-season or out-of-season.92  For
prohibited substances, the bill would adopt the Prohibited Substances List as
contained in the World Anti-Doping Association (WADA) Code.9 3 However,
the Secretary of Commerce, who is in charge of issuing the regulations, can
add substances known to be performance enhancing in a sport and remove
substances with no enhancing effect for professional athletes. 94 An athlete is
86. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, DRUG FREE SPORTS ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 109-210, pt.
1, at 4 (2005).
87. Hearings on H.R. 1862, supra note 48, at 1 (statement of Cliff Steams, Rep., Fla.).
88. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, DRUG FREE SPORTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 109-2 10 pt.
1, at4.
89. Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. (2005).
90. The Act has had the most congressional action and is the only bill to get as far as having a
Congressional Report to accompany it.
91. H.R. 3084 § 2(2).
92. Id. § 3(a)(1).
93. Id. § 3(2)(A)(i). WADA is an independent international anti-doping agency whose primary
responsibility is the development and oversight of the World Anti-Doping Code (the Code). See
World Anti-Doping Agency, Mission, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id
=255 (last visited Oct. 24, 2005). The Code is a uniform set of anti-doping rules adopted by most
national anti-doping organizations and international sport federations throughout the world. World
Anti-Doping Agency, Q & A on the Code, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?Page
Category.id=367 (last visited Oct. 24, 2005). As part of the Code, the Prohibited Substances List is
comprised of 150 banned substances. See WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, THE 2006 PROHIBITED
LIST INTERNATIONAL STANDARD (2006), available at http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/2006_- LIST.pdf.
94. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, DRUG FREE SPORTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 109-2 10, at
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subject to a half-season suspension for the first positive test, a full season
suspension for the second positive test, and a permanent suspension for any
subsequent positive test.95 If a league does not comply with the testing
policies and procedures set forth in the bill, it would be fined $5 million
initially with a possibility of additional fines of $1 million for each day of
noncompliance. 96
B. Clean Sports Acts of 2005,97 Professional Sports Integrity Act of 2005,98
and Professional Sports Integrity and Accountability Act99
These bills are very similar, differing only in the leagues required to
adhere to the act and the number of times an athlete can be randomly tested.
The Professional Sports Integrity and Accountability Act, similar to the Drug
Free Sports Act, requires that the Arena Football League, Major League
Soccer, the Women's NBA, and minor league baseball, in addition to the four
major professional sports, implement the requirements as set forth in the
bill.' 00 The remaining bills pertain only to the four major professional sports
leagues. 101
The final difference between the bills is the range of testing required. The
least restrictive bill requires an athlete to be tested a minimum of three times
during a calendar year.10 2 On the other hand, the most stringent bill requires
testing five times a year, including three times during the season and twice
during the off-season. 10 3 The remaining bill requires testing four times a
year-twice during the season and twice during the off-season.'0 4
The similarity of the bills is in the types of prohibited substances and the
severity of the penalty for violating the policy. All of the bills would adopt the
prohibited substances list from the United States Anti-Doping Agency
(USADA). 105  Additionally, all of the bills would require a two-year
95. H.R. 3084 § 3(5)(a).
96. Id. § 4.
97. Clean Sports Act of 2005, H.R. 2565, 109th Cong. (2005); Clean Sports Act of 2005, S.
1114, 109th Cong. (2005).
98. Professional Sports Integrity Act of 2005, H.R. 2516, 109th Cong. (2005).
99. Professional Sports Integrity and Accountability Act, S. 1334, 109th Cong. (2005).
100. S. 1334 § 3(5).
101. H.R. 2565 § 723(4); S. 1114 § 3(4); H.R. 2516 § 3(2).
102. S. 1334 § 5(d)(1).
103. S. 1114 § 4(b); H.R. 2565 § 724(b).
104. H.R. 2516 § 4(b)(1).
105. S. 1114 § 4(b); H.R. 2565 § 724(b); H.R. 2516 § 4(b)(3); S. 1334 § 5(b). In essence, this is
the same as adopting the WADA Code's Prohibited Substances List, as USADA adopts the Prohibited
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suspension for the first positive test and a lifetime ban for the second
violation. 106 However, under the Clean Sports Acts, a league could impose a
lesser penalty if the athlete "did not know or suspect, and could not reasonably
have known or suspected even with the exercise of utmost caution, that he had
used the prohibited substance."' 07
C. Integrity in Professional Sports Act108
The Integrity in Professional Sports Act was introduced in response to
MLB and the union not agreeing on a more stringent drug testing policy by the
promised date.' 0 9 The sponsor of the bill, Jim Bunning, said that "the World
Series has come and gone, and they still have not come to an agreement, so
we're going to move ahead in Congress." 110 He was also of the "opinion that
[MLB] and the players union w[ould] not come to an agreement that's
satisfactory."' 11
The bill is very similar to its predecessors, applying to the four major
sports leagues, 112 requiring a minimum of five tests in a calendar year, three
during the season and two during the off-season, 113 and mandating a two-year
suspension for the first positive test and a permanent suspension for the second
violation. 114 However, the bill does not specify which prohibited substances
would be tested for, only that athletes will "be tested for all prohibited
substances and prohibited methods for which testing is reasonable and
practicable at the time of the administration of each test."' '11 It also urges the
leagues to invalidate any personal records set by athletes using performance
enhancing drugs. 116
Substances List. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2005 GUIDE TO PROHIBITED
SUBSTANCES AND PROHIBITED METHODS OF DOPING 5 (2005), available at
http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/what/usada__guide.pdf; see also discussion supra note 93.
106. S. 1114 § 7(b); H.R. 2565 § 724(7)(B)(i); H.R. 2516 § 4(b)(6); S. 1334 § 5(e)(1).
107. S. 1114 § 7(b); H.R. 2565 § 724(7)(B)(i).
108. Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005).
109. The promised date was by the end of the 2005 World Series. See discussion supra Part
III.C.
110. Howard Fendrich, Bunning, McCain Plan New Steroids Bill, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/l 1/0l/AR2005110100757
.html.
111. Id.
112. S. 1960 § 4(7).
113. Id. § 6(c)(1)(A).
114. Id. § 6(d)(1).
115. Id. § 6(c)(3)(A).
116. Id. § 3(1).
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D. Comparison with the Leagues' Policies
The bills proposed by Congress are considerably more stringent on
steroid testing in professional sports than even the harshest policy formed by
any individual league. They differ significantly on the number of times a
player can be tested, the prohibited substances tested for, and the length of
suspension.
Under Congress's proposed bills, a player would be subject to testing
three to five times a year. 117 The NBA's policy has a mandated maximum
testing of five times a year, 118 the NFL requires testing at least once with no
maximum, 119 MLB requires testing twice with no maximum, 120 and the NHL
limits testing to two "no notice" tests. 121
Second, under Congress's bills, the professional leagues would be
required to test for substances as declared by the Prohibited Substances List of
the WADA Code.' 22 None of the sports leagues adopt this list and instead test
for substances that the union and the league can agree upon in collective
bargaining. The substances included under the Prohibited Substances List are
considerably more inclusive than those tested for by the leagues. The WADA
list includes over 150 substances 123 while the NBA, testing for the most
substances, includes eighty-seven. 124 Similarly, the NFL tests for eighty-four
substances. 125 However, the Drug Free Sports Act could accommodate the
leagues' prohibited substances by allowing the Secretary of Commerce to
individualize the policy by leaving out substances not shown to be
performance enhancing in a particular sport.126
Lastly, and most importantly, is the difference in the penalties for
testing positive for a performance enhancing substance under Congress's bills
117. Compare Professional Sports Responsibility and Accountability Act, S. 1334, 109th Cong.
§ 5(e)(1) (2005) (requiring testing three times a year) with Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th
Cong. § 4(b) (2005) (requiring testing five times a year).
118. 2005 NBA CBA, supra note 43, § 6(a).
119. NAT'L FOOTBALL PLAYERS ASS'N, supra note 51, § 3(A).
120. Press Release, Major League Baseball, supra note 77.
121. NAT'L HOCKEY LEAGUE, supra note 83.
122. Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. § 3(2)(a)(i) (2005). Some bills, such as the
Clean Sports Act, adopt the Prohibited Substances List from the USADA. Clean Sports Act of 2005,
H.R. 2565, 109th Cong. § 724(b). However, the USADA list is the same as the WADA list. See
discussion supra note 105.
123. See WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, supra note 93.
124. See 2005 NBA CBA, supra note 43, exhibit 1-2.
125. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 57, app. A.
126. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, DRUG FREE SPORTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 109-2 10, at
13(2005).
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and those imposed by the leagues. The least stringent bill would require a
half-season suspension for the first positive test, a full-season suspension for
the second, and a permanent suspension for the third violation. 127  The
majority of the bills, however, require a two-year suspension for the first
positive test and a permanent suspension for the second violation. 128
A full season suspension would equate to eighty-two games for the NBA
and NHL, one hundred and sixty-two for MLB, and sixteen for the NFL.
Under the least stringent penalty, as proposed by the Drug Free Sports Act, an
athlete would face a forty-one game suspension in the NBA and NHL, an
eighty-one game suspension in MLB, and an eight-game suspension in the
NFL for his first positive test. 129 In contrast, under the leagues' agreements, a
first positive test requires a ten-game suspension in the NBA, 130 a twenty-
game suspension in the NHL, 13 1 a fifty-game suspension in MLB, 132 and a
four-game suspension in the NFL. 133 Thus, even under the most lenient of
Congress's proposals, the penalty imposed is seventy-five percent greater than
the most severe league requirement and more than double that of the other
three leagues' requirements. The harsher penalty, the two-year suspension for
the first positive test, as proposed by the majority of legislation, 134 would be
around eight times longer than the most severe league penalty.
E. Impact of Congressional Action on the Leagues' Steroid Policies
Government-mandated requirements for steroid testing would
significantly alter the professional sports leagues' steroid testing policies.
Currently, all of the leagues have policies whose provisions would not meet
even the most lenient of Congress's proposals, 135 and therefore, they would be
127. Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. § 3(5)(A).
128. Clean Sports Act of 2005, H.R. 2565, 109th Cong. § 724(7)(A) (2005); Clean Sports Act of
2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. § 7(b) (2005); Professional Sports Integrity Act of 2005, H.R. 2516,
109th Cong. § 4(b)(6) (2005); Professional Sports Responsibility and Accountability Act, S. 1334,
109th Cong. § 5(e)(1) (2005). These penalties mirror those of the WADA code. WORLD ANTI-
DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 10.2 (2003), available at http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/code-v3.pdf.
129. H.R. 3084 § 3(5)(A). This is a half-season suspension for the first positive test as required
by the bill.
130. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, supra note 45, § 9(B).
131. NAT'L HOCKEY LEAGUE, supra note 83.
132. Press Release, Major League Baseball, supra note 77.
133. NAT'L FOOTBALL PLAYERS ASS'N, supra note 51, § 6.
134. See sources cited supra note 128.
135. See discussion supra Part IV.D. While all of the leagues' policies, except the NHL's, would
meet the bills' requirements for the number of times a player must be tested, none of them would meet
the requirements that would be imposed for the substances tested for and penalties for testing positive.
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required to strengthen their policies to the minimum required by the act.
Under the Drug Free Sports Act, the leagues would be "require[ed] . . . to
adopt and enforce policies and procedures for testing athletes ... for the use of
performance enhancing substances. Such policies and procedures shall, at
minimum, include" the requirements as set forth by the bill. 136 Similarly, the
other prominent bill, the Integrity in Professional Sports Act, requires the
following:
Each professional sports league shall adopt and enforce policies and
procedures to-(l) proscribe the use of prohibited substances and
prohibited methods by each professional athlete competing in a
professional sports event of the league; [and] (2) test for the use of
prohibited substances and prohibited methods by each professional
athlete competing in a professional sports event of the league .... 137
Furthermore, the bill makes it "unlawful for a professional sports league to
organize, sponsor, endorse, promote, produce, or recognize a professional
sports event without adopting and enforcing a testing policy that meets or
exceeds the requirements" of the bill. 138 These provisions would clearly
require the leagues to, at a minimum, adopt the steroid policy requirements as
set forth in the bill. Thus, to a large extent, government-mandated
requirements would remove steroid policies from collective bargaining. 139
While the leagues and unions could bargain for a more stringent policy, 140 it is
highly unlikely given the difficulty in bargaining for the current policies.
V. LEGAL CHALLENGE TO LEAGUE STEROID TESTING POLICIES
The current drug testing policies of professional sports leagues are
promulgated through collective bargaining between the players' unions and
the leagues. 14 1  Because these policies are formed through collective
bargaining and implemented by the leagues, who are private actors, athletes
are rarely able to challenge steroid testing based on state or United States
136. Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. § 3(a) (2005).
137. Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. § 6(a) (2005).
138. Id. § 5.
139. Technically, a bill would not remove steroid testing from collective bargaining because the
unions and leagues could still bargain over the steroid policy for terms in excess of those set forth in
the act. However, given the stringent testing requirements set forth in the bills, it is highly unlikely
that most unions would bargain over the policy.
140. S. 1960 § 9(b) ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit a professional sports
league from adopting and enforcing policies and procedures more stringent than the requirements of
this Act.").
141. See supra Part II.
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constitutional grounds. 142 Although constitutional provisions, such as the
Fourth Amendment search and seizure provision, 143 do not apply to actions
taken by a private party like a professional sports league, the Constitution
protects against private actions where they can be fairly attributed to the
state. 144 If the government enacted a law mandating regulations for steroid
testing policies for the professional sports leagues, the leagues' drug testing
policies would likely be challenged under a constitutional provision with the
threshold issue of state action.
145
A. State Action
State action requires a constitutional deprivation "caused by the exercise
of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed
by the State," and that a private party depriving the constitutional right must
be "a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." 146 Where a private
actor acts pursuant to a government regulation, the first requirement is
satisfied. 147 The second requirement is satisfied where "there is a sufficiently
close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the [private actor]
so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself."' 148 Whether a close nexus exists is determined by examining whether
the state has exercised coercive power or given significant encouragement so
142. MITTEN, supra note 19, at 657-68; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches and seizures
"effected by a private party on his own initiative"); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488
U.S. 179, 191 (1988) ("Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a dichotomy
between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under the Amendment's Due Process Clause, and
private conduct, against which the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct
may be."); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ("[T]he principle has become firmly embedded
in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is
only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.").
143. Government-mandated drug testing is usually challenged under the Fourth Amendment
because First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment challenges have generally failed. See CHARLES V.
DALE, FEDERALLY MANDATED RANDOM DRUG TESTING IN PROFESSIONAL ATHLETICS:
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 2 (2005), available at
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32911 20050627.pdf.
144. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
145. The drug testing policy of a league would likely be challenged by an athlete who tested
positive under the policy. See Long v. Nat'l Football League, 870 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
146. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); see also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978) (adopting the two-
part test).
147. Am. Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 50. In this instance, the government regulation was a state statute.
Id.
148. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351; see also Am. Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 52.
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that the actions of the private party must be deemed as that of the state. 149
A sufficiently close nexus does not exist between a league's drug testing
policy, implemented through collective bargaining, and the state for state
action to be present. In Long v. National Football League,150 Terry Long
challenged the NFL's drug testing policy on constitutional grounds, claiming
that there was a sufficient nexus between the league's policy and state
action. 151 Long challenged the NFL's policy after he tested positive for an
anabolic steroid and was suspended by the NFL in accordance with its drug
testing policy. 152 The court rejected Long's argument of a sufficient nexus
between the NFL's policy and the state, saying that the NFL's policy was not
influenced by the state and the state did not "formulate[] the standards" for or
"in any way influence[] or implement[]" the NFL's drug testing policy.153
However, a sufficiently close nexus can exist between a private
employer's drug testing policy and the state when the state compels the
employer to comply with a regulation or where the regulation supersedes the
employer's CBA. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 154 the
government issued regulations that not only required railroad companies to
drug test employees involved in major accidents but permitted the companies
to drug test employees in other certain circumstances. 155 Both regulations
were held to be such governmental action as to implicate the Fourth
Amendment. 156 The regulation requiring the railroads to drug test employees
was attributable to the government because the government was compelling
the railroads to comply with the requirements, and thus, "the lawfulness of its
acts is controlled by the Fourth Amendment."' 57 Even the regulation merely
permitting the railroads to drug test employees implicated the Fourth
Amendment because the regulation was intended to supersede any inconsistent
149. Am. Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 52; Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
150. Long, 870 F. Supp. 101.
151. Id. at 103. Long challenged the drug testing policy based on the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. He claimed that the city of Pittsburgh collecting
tax from the sale of tickets, providing services for the team, and appointing board members to the
Stadium Authority was enough state action to bring a constitutional claim against the NFL and his
team, the Pittsburgh Steelers. Id. at 104.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 105.
154. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
155. Id. at 609-11. The railroad companies were permitted to drug test employees after an
accident where a supervisor had reasonable suspicion that an employee caused the accident, where a
specific rule has been violated, and where reasonable suspicion existed based on the supervisor's own
observations of an employee. Id. at 611.
156. Id.; see also infra Part V.C.l.
157. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
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provision of the CBA and required the railroads not to collectively bargain
away the right to drug test. 158
On the contrary, a sufficiently close nexus will not exist where a
government regulation does not substitute its judgment for, or formulate
standards for, decisions of a private employer. Pennsylvania's workers
compensation regulation that permitted insurers to withhold payments for
disputed claims until review was not considered a state action in American
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan.159 An insufficient nexus
existed between the insurer's decisions and the state regulation because the
insurer made the decisions on whether to withhold payments and the
regulation did not articulate any standards to make such decisions. 160
Furthermore, the regulation was not an encouragement for or authorization of
the insurers to withhold payments. 161
B. State Action for Government-Mandated Steroid Testing
Challenging the current steroids policies of the professional sports
leagues on constitutional grounds is highly unlikely because the leagues are
private actors. 162 However, steroid policies implemented by the leagues in
accordance with government regulations might be successfully challenged as
state action, and if so, would be open to challenge on a variety of
constitutional grounds. Although Congress may declare that "[n]othing in this
Act shall be construed to deem ... any professional sports league an agent of
or an actor on behalf of the United States Government,"' 163 such a
determination is not up to Congress to make; 164 a sufficiently close nexus
between the leagues' policies and the state may exist and state action may be
present.
158. Id. at 615-16. These requirements were evidence that the government did not "adopt a
passive position" but "encourage[d], endorse[d], and participate[d]" in drug testing. Id.
159. 526 U.S. 40, 43, 51 (1999).
160. Id. at 52.
161. Id. at 53 ("We have never held that the mere availability of a remedy for wrongful conduct,
even when the private use of that remedy serves important public interests, so significantly
encourages the private activity as to make the State responsible for it.").
162. See Long v. Nat'l Football League, 870 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (denying the claim
that the NFL's drug policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because the policy was
not a state action); supra part V.
163. Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. § 9(a) (2005).
164. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 382 (1995). In Lebron, even
though the statute declared that Amtrak was not an agent or actor of the government, the Court found
that it was, concluding that the statute governed matters in Congress's control, but not challenges
outside of Congress's control. Id. at 392.
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For a league's actions in regards to its drug testing policy to be attributed
to the state, there must be a "sufficiently close nexus between the [government
regulation] and the challenged action of the [league] so that the action of the
[league] may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' 165 A nexus may be
found where the state "formulated the standards" for or "influenced or
implemented" the league's drug testing policy; 166 encouraged, endorsed and
participated in drug testing; 167 compelled the league to comply with its
regulation; 168 or intended the regulation to supersede the league's CBA. 169
Under the current legislation, leagues would be required to adopt the
government regulations regarding drug testing of athletes.170 This compulsion
by the government to comply with its requirements is similar to the mandatory
drug testing in Skinner, which implicated the Fourth Amendment. 17 1 The
government regulations are also intended to supersede any inconsistent
provision of the CBA by requiring minimum standards, 172 similar to the
permissive drug testing in Skinner.173 Contrary to Long and Sullivan, these
regulations would greatly influence and set the standards for the leagues'
steroid testing policies. The league would not make the decisions, like the
insurers' decisions in Sullivan,174 on when, who, or how to drug test. Even if
the leagues were said to make decisions regarding drug testing, they would be
following the standards set by the government to make those decisions. It
seems likely that the government would be encouraging, endorsing, and
participating in the leagues' drug testing policies were it to mandate
requirements for steroid testing. Based on the above analysis, a sufficient
165. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). While the test for state action has
two requirements, the first requirement of a constitutional deprivation by actions of the state is met by
the league acting pursuant to the government regulation. The test for the second requirement,
whether the league may fairly be said to be a state actor, is the close nexus test. See supra Part V.A.
166. See Long, 870 F. Supp. at 105.
167. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1989).
168. Id. at 614.
169. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
170. See supra Part IV.E.
171. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
172. The government regulations on steroid testing do not state in the bill that they are intended
to supersede the CBA, but this would be the practical effect of the regulations. See Integrity in
Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. § 9(c) (2005) ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to have any effect on the collective bargaining obligations of any employer that is not subject to this
Act or on any subject matter that is outside of the scope of this Act.").
173. Skinner, 489U.S. at615-16.
174. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) (explaining that the insurers,
not the government, made the individual decisions and that the standards to make the decisions were
also not formulated by the government).
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nexus could exist between the government-mandated steroid testing
requirements and the leagues' steroid testing policies that the polices would be
considered state action and subject to constitutional challenge.
C. Constitutional Challenge to League Steroid Policies
A major concern with government-mandated steroid testing requirements
is that they would open the door to constitutional challenges. If the leagues'
steroid policies, as formulated under government regulation, were deemed
state action, then a variety of constitutional claims could be brought
challenging the policies. 175  Regardless of whether these challenges are
successful, the leagues and government could be faced with defending a
variety of continuous claims.
1. Fourth Amendment Challenge
Although different constitutional claims could be introduced, the most
prevalent issue raised with government-mandated drug testing requirements is
that the policy would be an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. 176 The Fourth Amendment provides each person in the United
States with the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures" by the federal government. 177
Generally, a warrant supported by probable cause is needed for a reasonable
search and seizure.178 However, a search not supported by probable cause can
be constitutional where "special needs beyond the normal need for law
enforcement" exist. 179 A special need is a judicially created exception to "the
warrant and probable-cause requirement"' 80 for suspicionless drug testing. 181
Where a special need is not found and no probable cause and warrant exists,
the drug testing is in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 182  The
175. The policies could be challenged under various state constitutional provisions, and drug
testing policies in general are challenged under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution. DALE, supra note 143, at 2 n.2.
176. The Fourth Amendment has been the primary vehicle for challenging drug testing polices
because First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment challenges have usually been unsuccessful. See id.
177. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
178. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
179. Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
180. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
181. DALE, supra note 143, at 2; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 653; PHILLIP A.
HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW 295 (2005).
182. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (requiring state office candidates to undergo
drug testing before running for office violated the Fourth Amendment because using testing to set a
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constitutionality of a special needs search is evaluated under a reasonableness
standard where the governmental interests are balanced against the
individual's privacy interests. 183
The special needs doctrine has been applied to suspicionless drug testing
where the government can establish a compelling justification or where those
persons tested have diminished expectations of privacy. Drug testing
employees in safety-sensitive positions is a compelling government
justification where the special needs doctrine applies to protect the safety of
the public and fellow employees "from the threat of an impaired employee
with access to dangerous instrumentalities."' 184 The Supreme Court has upheld
suspicionless drug testing on this principle for Customs Service employees
seeking promotion to positions requiring seizure of illegal drugs and the
carrying of firearms, 185 and to railroad employees involved in accidents or
who violated safety standards. 186 The principle has also been applied by the
federal courts to random testing of horse racing jockeys. 187 In testing of the
railroad employees and the jockeys, the compelling government interest was
strengthened by the fact that these employees worked in pervasively regulated
industries, which diminished their expectations of privacy. 88
The special needs doctrine also has been applied to the public school
setting where the government has an important interest and the students being
tested have diminished expectations of privacy. 189 The government has an
important interest in protecting the health and safety of the student-athletes 9°
and preventing drug use among those who look up to athletes as role
good example was not a special need that outweighed the candidate's privacy interests); see also
DALE, supra note 143, at 3.
183. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
184. Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1195 (7th Cir. 1989).
185. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989). The potential
harm to the public due to one of the individuals using drugs while performing his or her job
outweighed the individual's privacy interests. Id. at 679.
186. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34.
187. Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1991). This testing was a special need
because the safety of the participants and the government's interest in protecting tax revenue from
betting on racing was greater than the individual's moderate privacy infringement as he or she was
employed in a highly regulated industry, lessening the expectation of privacy. Id. at 684. Drug
testing of those involved in horse racing was also held not to violate the Fourth Amendment in
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
188. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627; Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 684.
189. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (upholding random drug testing of public
school students participating in extracurricular activities); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646 (1995) (upholding random drug testing of public school athletes).
190. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661-62.
[Vol. 17:2
2007] STEROID TESTING POLICIES IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 673
models.191 Furthermore, the athletes have diminished expectations of privacy
because they are in a school environment1 92 and because of the inherent nature
of voluntarily participating in athletics. 193
2. Government-Mandated Regulations and the Fourth Amendment
Whether government-mandated drug testing of professional athletes is
a special needs exception requires a "context-specific inquiry," weighing
carefully the individual's privacy interests against the government's
interests. 194 Because the special needs doctrine is context-specific, arguments
can be made for either side that congressionally mandated drug testing of
professional athletes does or does not fall within the doctrine. This analysis is
further complicated due to the unique nature of professional athletics and the
lack of analogous precedent.
The basis for an argument that drug testing fits within the special needs
doctrine is that the government's interest in protecting the integrity of
professional sports and the health and welfare of professional athletes and
youth athletes who emulate professional athletes outweighs the diminished
privacy expectations of the athletes. The privacy interests of the athletes
would be infringed upon by drug testing, but the extent of the infringement
would be in question. Similar to high school and college athletes who have
diminished expectations of privacy, 195 professional athletes may have
diminished expectations of privacy because they must commonly undergo
physical evaluations, follow certain rules and regulations specific to only their
sport, frequently give information to their team, coaches, and trainers about
their physical condition and medical treatment, and work in less-than-private
surroundings due to communal changing and showering and constant media
attention. 196
Two of the most articulated governmental interests for drug testing
191. Id. at 663. The government interest was in deterring drug use by athletes and by the general
school population that looks up to athletes as role models. Id.
192. Id. at 655 (discussing that the most significant element of the case was the guardian
relationship that the government has over public school children and that this relationship permitted a
"degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults"); see also Earls, 536
U.S. at 830 (explaining that the essential basis of Vernonia was the school's custodial responsibility
over its students).
193. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (explaining that participation in sports requires changing and
showering in less-than-private surroundings).
194. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997).
195. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657; Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 865 P.2d 633, 648 (Cal.
1994).
196. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657; Hill, 865 P.2d at 648, 658.
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programs are to protect the health and welfare of professional athletes and to
deter steroid use by young athletes who emulate those athletes. 197 The health
and welfare of professional athletes and young athletes is a compelling
government interest, as one of the major purposes of the special needs
exception is to protect the safety of the public and fellow employees from an
impaired employee. 198 Safety of the public and fellow employees was a
compelling justification for drug testing those participating in horse racing, 199
customs service employees,200 and railroad workers. 20 1 Use of performance
enhancing drugs has significant health consequences for professional athletes
who take them,202 but can also affect young athletes who look to professional
athletes as role models.20 3  Use of performance enhancing drugs by
professional athletes has been connected to the increased use of such
substances by young athletes.20 4 Additionally, the "tolerance of performance
enhancing substances by professional athletes has increased the pressure on
[young athletes] to use performance enhancing substances in order to advance
their athletic careers." 20 5 When coupling the health effects on professional
athletes with the justification of deterring drug use in young athletes who look
to professional athletes as role models, similar to the role model effect of the
high school athletes,206 the government interest is even more compelling.
On the contrary, the argument that drug testing does not fit within the
special needs exception is that the privacy expectations of the athletes
outweigh the slight governmental interests. The argument that professional
athletes have diminished expectations of privacy because of the nature of
athletics, such as in the high school athletes' case, suffers because it overlooks
the key elements of the public school cases: the custodial relationship of the
government over school children20 7 and the nature of athletic participation.
The custodial relationship gives the government more interest and control over
197. Steven 0. Ludd, Athletics, Drug Testing and the Right to Privacy: A Question of Balance,
34 HOW. L.J. 599, 619 (1991). See also Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. § 2
(2005); Danaher, supra note 61, at 315.
198. See Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1195 (7th Cir. 1989). See also supra Part V.C.1.
199. See Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1991).
200. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
201. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
202. S. 1960 § 2(a)(3).
203. S. 1960 § 2(a).
204. Id. § 2(a)(6).
205. Id. § 2(a)(7).
206. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995).
207. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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the students, 20 8 whereas the government does not have this control over
professional athletes, which may increase their expectations of privacy as
compared to high school athletes. Additionally, in high school and college
sports, athletes do not have a property right, only the privilege, of participating
in school athletics, 20 9 whereas professional athletes are employed to play
sports and thus have a property right.
Professional athletes also do not have diminished expectations of
privacy as they do not work in a pervasively regulated industry, 210 such as
horse racing 211 or the railroad industry.212 In fact, it could be argued that
professional sports is an industry that is generally unregulated by the
government. The media, teams, leagues, and players' unions are the primary
avenues used to regulate the industry. The industry, and professional athletes
specifically, are subject to relentless scrutiny, so drug testing of the athletes
may infringe on their privacy more than an incremental amount.
The health and welfare of the public and fellow employees was a
compelling justification for drug testing those participating in horse racing,213
customs service employees,214 and railroad workers. 215  However, a
distinction between the drug testing in those cases and drug testing
professional athletes is the highly regulated nature of those industries.
Additionally, an athlete who takes performance enhancing drugs and
participates in a sport does not endanger the health and welfare of himself or
his fellow athletes as much as a railroad employee, customs service employee,
or jockey who takes an illegal narcotic such as cocaine or marijuana. While an
athlete taking a performance enhancing substance may be able to hit the ball
harder, run faster, or jump higher, his substance use does not impair his mental
capabilities and functioning as does an employee taking an illegal narcotic.
Overall, the privacy expectations of professional athletes, possibly
diminished due to the inherent nature of athletics, would be weighed against
the government's interest in protecting the health and welfare of the
professional athletes and young athletes, which might possibly be compelling
when examined together.
208. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.
209. Brands v. Sheldon Cmty. Sch., 671 F. Supp. 627, 631 (N.D. Iowa 1987); Hysaw v.
Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 944-45 (D. Kan. 1987).
210. Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 1991).
211. See id.
212. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).
213. See Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 683.
214. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
215. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34.
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VI. WHERE DOES THE RESPONSIBILITY LIE?
Drug testing policies for the professional sports leagues should be left to
the individual leagues and not to Congress. Formulating appropriate standards
is best accomplished by the leagues and players at the collective bargaining
table and not in congressional sessions because congressionally mandated drug
testing creates complications that otherwise do not exist.
First, implementing drug testing policies through collective bargaining
results in the policies being more accepted and minimizes, if not eliminates,
judicial challenges. Collectively bargaining a drug testing policy tends to
result in greater acceptance from those affected by the policy than if it were
required by Congress. For the policy to be included in a CBA, both the
players and the league must agree upon it and its substance. This aspect gives
both parties an ownership in the policy, strengthening their acceptance of and
adherence to the policy that would not be present if they were compelled by
the government to follow certain requirements.
By implementing the policy through collective bargaining, the terms of the
policy are protected from judicial challenge, unlike a federal law. A
significant example of the difference between a collectively bargained for
policy and a government mandate is the banning of Ephedra. The NFL
initially banned the drug, followed by the FDA; however the FDA's ban was
later limited by a court's decision. 216  Implemented under collective
bargaining and the NLRA, courts give great deference to coolectively
bargained terms and will not subject them to such scrutiny. Under
government-mandated testing, even collectively bargained terms in excess of
the prescribed minimum requirements might not be safe from judicial scrutiny.
Furthermore, a government-mandated policy could be subject to a Fourth
Amendment challenge, as discussed above, and various other federal or state
constitutional challenges.
Second, collective bargaining "allows for a more rapid and certain
response to developments in doping and anti-doping technology" than does
congressional action.217 While this may not always be the case, as collective
bargaining can be a slow process, it does have the potential to be more
responsive to changes in the drug testing landscape than a federal law. Similar
to the NFL banning Ephedra before the FDA, it also banned Andro seven
years before Congress declared it a controlled substance. 218 Waiting until the
216. See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (D. Utah 2005).
217. Hearings on H.R. 1862, supra note 48, at 100 (statement of Paul Tagliabue, Commissioner,
National Football League).
218. Id. The NFL banned Andro in 1997 and Congress declared it a controlled substance in
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Secretary of Commerce makes determinations on which drugs are
performance enhancing, as provided for in various bills, could allow players to
use some prohibited substances longer than if the policy was controlled by the
league and players.
Third, one size does not fit all. A policy created by Congress and
applicable to the four major professional sports leagues does not take into
account the differences between the leagues. The average career length of an
athlete varies significantly between the leagues,2 1 9 and thus, a uniform
suspension would have a different impact on each athlete depending on what
league he is in. The four major sports are also different in what they require
physically. 220 Therefore, testing each sport for the same substances may be
underinclusive, not testing for substances that help enhance performance in a
sport, or overinclusive, testing for substances that have no bearing on a
particular sport.
Finally, Congress has more pressing issues to deal with than regulating
drug testing in professional sports. Professional sports and drug testing are
popular topics, giving congressmen who introduce bills media attention and
popularity within their respective states. However, "[i]f [Congress] passed a
steroids bill now while letting the deficit careen out of control and not doing
much to get Iraq on track, [they] would attract a lot of ridicule for spending
their time on it." 22 1 It is generally agreed that "[s]teroids are bad, we don't
want our athletes to use them and it sets poor examples for our young people,
but we've just seen massive failures of governance on the national and local
level. ' 222 If Congress wants to reduce the use of performance enhancing
drugs by youth, there are other, more effective ways to accomplish this and
more important issues to our nation than performance enhancing drug use by
professional athletes.
If Congress's purpose in formulating drug testing acts was to pressure the
leagues to strengthen their policies, it has accomplished this goal. Congress
2004. Id.
219. Rob Demovsky, When This Year's NFL Superstar Becomes Next Year's Free-Agent Bust,
GMs Learn a Hard Lesson, GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE, Oct. 19, 2003, at IC. The average career
length of an NFL player is 3.3 years; an NBA player, 4 years; and an NHL Player, 5.5 years. Id.
MLB does not keep the statistic. Id.
220. For example, while basketball requires lean and agile athletes, football requires athletes with
more strength.
221. James R. Carroll, Congress Ready to Crack Down on Steroids, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J.,
Sept. 28, 2005, available at http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dlllarticle?AID=/20050928/
NEWS0104/509280435/1008/NEWSO1 (quoting Norman Ornstein, Senior Analyst, American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research).
222. Id. (quoting Michael McCann, Sports Law Professor, Mississippi College School of Law in
Jackson).
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should continue to leave drug testing policies to the leagues to modify as they
see fit and as external pressure, such as that from the media and fans,
demands. The leagues have brought their policies to a respectable level where
the athletes will be deterred from using performance enhancing drugs and face
a high likelihood of being caught if they do use steroids.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of performance enhancing drugs by athletes in professional
team sports has attracted considerable attention in recent years. A substantial
amount of the attention has been due to Congress's involvement in proposing
a variety of bills that would regulate the steroid testing policies of the
professional sports leagues. Increased scrutiny by Congress, the media, and
the fans has led the leagues to implement steroid testing policies that test
athletes more often, for more substances, and with more stringent penalties.
However, these policies still would not meet the requirements of even the most
lenient of Congress's proposed bills.
While Congress's proposals might be stricter than the leagues' current
policies, the benefits of harsher steroid policies are outweighed by the
complications that government-mandated steroid testing creates. One of the
major complications, a league's steroid testing policy being challenged on
constitutional grounds, would create considerable problems for the
government and the leagues regardless of whether such challenges were
successful, especially if state action were found.
It is debatable whether performance enhancing drug use by professional
athletes is a significant problem when examined across all of the professional
sports leagues. Even so, the leagues, operating within the restraints of
collective bargaining, have improved their steroid policies to be in greater
harmony with Congress's bills. The leagues' policies are sufficiently stringent
to accomplish the objective of preventing steroid use by athletes, and future
changes in the leagues' policies would be best accomplished by the individual
leagues and not by Congress.
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